For human rights and freedom in Gaza
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קולותStimmen
Voices ٔاصوات
Music and Poetry by Jewish and Arab performers
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from the Middle East
A benefit concert for Gaza
Tuesday ,23.4.2013Doors 19:00 Gotischer Saal, Schmiedehof ,17Kreuzberg, 10965Berlin THE PROJECT Jewish and Arab performers from the Middle East use their
voices, texts and musical instruments to express their
solidarity with Gaza, bringing their resistance to the ongoing
occupation and oppression of Palestinians to the stage. All
donations collected at the VOICES benefit are transferred
to Medico International, a social and medical aid
organization.Medico works together withthe Palestinian Medical Relief Society and Physicians for Human Rights Israelto achieve free access to healthcare and sustainable development in the Gaza Strip. This, we hope, will bring an end to violence and exclusion. So far, we atVOICES have been able to collect a few thousand Euros for these purposes, thanks to both our performers and enthusiastic audience alike. |
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THE PROGRAM
The program includes poetry by the world renowned Palestinian
poet Mahmoud Darwish and the Jewish writer Lea Goldberg; songs
by Feiruz and Billy Holliday; traditional Arabic and Jewish
instrumental music ,and original compositions by the
participants. After the show the public is welcome to join an
open discussion with the performers.
THE COMPANY
The company consists of 10-15Jewish and Arab performers from
Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and
Germany, currently living in Berlin.
Contact: iwab.berlin@googlemail.com; 49(0)176-31212109+
Videos: http://www.youtube.com/user/iwabberlinFB: http://www.facebook.com/events/461188277284109/ |
Showing posts with label Worth reading. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Worth reading. Show all posts
Thursday, 18 April 2013
Tuesday, 23.4.2013 A benefit concert for Gaza
24/6/93 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL (NK/AH) MEMO ON JOINT CONCEPT/LAND WORKING GROUP MEETING 24/6/93
24/6/93 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL (NK/AH)
MEMO ON JOINT CONCEPT/LAND WORKING GROUP MEETING 24/6/93
Rubinstein's questions today deserve to be taken with the utmost seriousness. The words used ("In your model, which I have been asked about by my government, in the territorial model, what will be the legal status of Israelis and the legal status of Israeli armed forces in the territories") represent an explicit formal request for clarification of our model, particularly since he repeated twice that he was speaking at the instructions of his government, and he made it at a special joint session he requested. They also represent a tentative, limited movement onto the ground of our approach, which is a partly result of our efforts over the past few days (notably the discussion of security with the US and them, and our critique of their functional approach).
This may be a small breakthrough, and must be seen in light of persistent information from different sources that the Israelis will sooner or later give up some aspects of their denial of our territorial approach. This will probably not come soon, but how soon it comes will be materially affected by whether, and how, we choose to respond to their questions. Camille and I tried to answer as carefully and as positively as possible during the session (see the minutes). I suggest that strict instructions be given that this tone and NO OTHER be used by all members of the delegation in dealing with this matter, with US and Israel.
Clearly, a full response to these difficult questions cannot be made immediately, and perhaps some aspects of them cannot be answered now at all. However, this is definitely the time to try to develop aspects of a response which can be reviewed by the leadership and given to the Israeli side, perhaps as early as next week, if that is approved. Camille could continue initial work he and I have started on settlements, and Ahmad what his group began on security, in order to produce a draft response on each question.
It would be a mistake to treat this as a debating point, or to reject it out of hand, or to refuse to offer anything unless the Israeli side offers something in return. They have asked us about our territorial approach, which they have always rejected, and have said that it is for the information of their government.
It would be tactically wrong not to TRY to answer these questions, if that is approved by our leadership, which has already given us clear guidelines which can be used as a basis (see my "Draft Talking Points on Security" for ideas taken from these guidelines, some of which could be reused for this purpose).
It is very much in our interest to show the Israelis and the US how a territorial approach is fully compatible with a) reasonable Israeli concerns on security and settlers, and b) options for permanent status compatible with the terms of reference remaining open. This MAY be an opportunity for us to achieve progress along the lines of our own proposals, for the first time. We should not waste this limited opportunity, nor minimize it, nor exaggerate
it. MEMO ON JOINT CONCEPT/LAND WORKING GROUP MEETING 24/6/93
Rubinstein's questions today deserve to be taken with the utmost seriousness. The words used ("In your model, which I have been asked about by my government, in the territorial model, what will be the legal status of Israelis and the legal status of Israeli armed forces in the territories") represent an explicit formal request for clarification of our model, particularly since he repeated twice that he was speaking at the instructions of his government, and he made it at a special joint session he requested. They also represent a tentative, limited movement onto the ground of our approach, which is a partly result of our efforts over the past few days (notably the discussion of security with the US and them, and our critique of their functional approach).
This may be a small breakthrough, and must be seen in light of persistent information from different sources that the Israelis will sooner or later give up some aspects of their denial of our territorial approach. This will probably not come soon, but how soon it comes will be materially affected by whether, and how, we choose to respond to their questions. Camille and I tried to answer as carefully and as positively as possible during the session (see the minutes). I suggest that strict instructions be given that this tone and NO OTHER be used by all members of the delegation in dealing with this matter, with US and Israel.
Clearly, a full response to these difficult questions cannot be made immediately, and perhaps some aspects of them cannot be answered now at all. However, this is definitely the time to try to develop aspects of a response which can be reviewed by the leadership and given to the Israeli side, perhaps as early as next week, if that is approved. Camille could continue initial work he and I have started on settlements, and Ahmad what his group began on security, in order to produce a draft response on each question.
It would be a mistake to treat this as a debating point, or to reject it out of hand, or to refuse to offer anything unless the Israeli side offers something in return. They have asked us about our territorial approach, which they have always rejected, and have said that it is for the information of their government.
It would be tactically wrong not to TRY to answer these questions, if that is approved by our leadership, which has already given us clear guidelines which can be used as a basis (see my "Draft Talking Points on Security" for ideas taken from these guidelines, some of which could be reused for this purpose).
It is very much in our interest to show the Israelis and the US how a territorial approach is fully compatible with a) reasonable Israeli concerns on security and settlers, and b) options for permanent status compatible with the terms of reference remaining open. This MAY be an opportunity for us to achieve progress along the lines of our own proposals, for the first time. We should not waste this limited opportunity, nor minimize it, nor exaggerate
Rashid Khalidi: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East
The 15 documents that appear here chronologically are appendices to Rashid Khalidi's new book BROKERS OF DECEIT: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East. These previously unpublished documents related to Oslo and the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations appear for the first time here on the Institute's website. The bibliography to the book also appears below. For more info on the book, its author, and how to buy the book follow the links below:
Now, in his new book, BROKERS OF DECEIT: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East, noted Middle East scholar, Rashid Khalidi, examines three historical moments to reveal why the American brokered negotiations, going back thirty-five years, have not only failed, but have actively undermined progress towards a peace settlement. The misuse of language has corrupted both thought and action surrounding Palestine and Israel, notes Khalidi, especially with regards to terms such as “terrorism,” “security,” and “self-determination.” America’s oft repeated mantra about a “peace process,” he writes in the introduction, has long “served to disguise an ugly reality: whatever process the United States was championing, it was not in fact actually directed at achieving a just and lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis.” In unveiling what he sees as a dishonest, yet carefully constructed narrative surrounding US policy towards Palestine, Khalidi focuses on the Reagan Plan of 1982, the 1991-1993 period from the Madrid Peace Conference to the signing of the Oslo Accords, and President Obama’s retreat from his initially firm positions on the pre-conditions for a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Khalidi, who was an advisor to the Palestinian delegation during the Madrid and Washington negotiations leading up to Oslo, bases his analysis on recently declassified memos and US government records, on confidential documents in his possession, and on his survey of public statements and actions taken by the American and Israeli governments. These documents, as well as the historical record going back to Truman, explains Khalidi, reflect three patterns that have consistently shaped American policy towards the Israeli-Palestine conflict: intense concern with US domestic politics, driven by Israel’s powerful supporters in America, the absence of pressure from the oil-rich Arab Gulf monarchies, and little or no concern for the rights of Palestinians. In the lead up to his examination of the Reagan Plan, Khalidi discusses the diplomatic history around the Israeli-Palestinian problem, including Jimmy Carter’s thwarted efforts to change the discourse around Palestinian rights, Gerald Ford’s secret 1975 letter which promised Israel prior approval of American initiatives in Middle East peace negotiations, and Anwar Sadat’s separate 1979 peace treaty with Israel, which contributed in the following years to the failed negotiations regarding Palestinian autonomy. It was against this backdrop, explains Khalidi, and in the wake of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and the American brokered cease-fire and the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, that Ronald Reagan and his secretary of state George Schultz saw the opportunity for a new Middle East peace initiative. In tracing the eventual demise of the Reagan Plan, which called among other things for ending Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land and halting settlement expansion, Khalidi points to a confidential National Intelligence Council memo that presciently detailed for US policymakers the obstacles Menachem Begin could be expected to raise. Khalidi also refers to a newly declassified handwritten note by Begin that spelled out his government’s bottom line, including the many restrictions they would insist on placing on Palestinian autonomy and their assertion that the Camp David Accords ruled out the emergence of a Palestinian state. The memo’s significance, argues Khalidi, lies in the fact that “over time the very low ceiling established by Menachem Begin and his successors for what the Palestinians under occupation would be allowed to obtain by Israel has become the continuing limit on what American policymakers will allow, or even foresee, for them.” This limit, argues Khalidi, would be repeatedly bumped up against, including during the second moment he focuses on, the 1991-1993 negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accords. As in the wake of the 1982 war, he explains, President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker saw in the quick expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in the 1991 war, and the consequent weakening of the PLO’s position as a result of backing Saddam Hussein, an opportunity to renew efforts at resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. From this strategic moment, which also included the decline of the USSR and its weakened influence in the region, Khalidi traces the negotiating process, drawing on his direct experiences of the events as an advisor to the Palestinian delegation in both Madrid and Washington. He details why the Palestinians were disadvantaged throughout the talks, including the conditions set for limiting their representation, which impaired the effectiveness of their negotiators, the establishment of a “transitional period” that allowed the Israelis to further entrench their occupation and expand settlements, and the long delay of “final status” negotiations, all of which hugely reinforced a status quo favorable to Israel. Khalidi highlights the roles of various key figures during this period, including chief American negotiators Dennis Ross and Aaron David Miller; their Israeli counterpart, Elyakim Rubinstein; the national leader and physician who headed the Palestinian delegation, Haidar ‘Abd al-Shafi; and PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Arafat, explains Khalidi, ignored the advice of his advisors and, seduced by finally being recognized as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, blundered gravely in negotiating the deal reached in Oslo. “In effect,” he writes, “it allowed Israel to continue gobbling up the pie, the partitioning of which the two sides were, eventually, supposed to negotiate.” Explaining why the PLO agreed to the Oslo deal, which ultimately confirmed Begin’s scheme of refusing Palestinian self-determination, Khalidi points to the weakening of the PLO during their long exile in Tunis, the absence of financial support from Arab Gulf countries after the PLO’s miscalculation in backing Saddam Hussein in the war with Kuwait, and, perhaps most significantly, their utter failure, after twenty-five years living outside the country, to understand the daily experience of Palestinians living under Israeli’s occupation regime. Ultimately, though, the Israeli-PLO secret negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accords, argues Khalidi, underscored how American refusal to push beyond what they inaccurately perceived as Israeli “red lines” had the effect of hobbling US diplomacy, with the Israelis stepping around the US to talk directly with the PLO. Turning to the Obama administration, Khalidi examines how this advantaging of Israel has continued to squander the possibilities for Israeli-Palestinian peace. He traces the President’s stance toward the Palestinian problem, including how his initial attempts to recalibrate policy were thwarted by the newly elected Binyamin Netanyahu’s hard line, including his constant invoking of the Iran threat, and complicated by domestic politic considerations, especially after the House Republicans’ victory in the midterm elections. Today Obama’s climb-down to a conventional “pro-Israel” stance is complete, notes Khalidi, as reflected in his September 2011 speech to the UN General Assembly, which repeated longstanding rhetoric about Israel’s victim status and security concerns. Khalidi concludes with a discussion of how the US’s two main Middle East allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, have shaped American policy in the region, especially with regard to Iran and the tragic proxy war in Syria. He underscores that there is no serious Arab counterweight or constellation of international powers to challenge the US’s role, particularly having to do with Palestine and Israeli’s stated agenda of continued occupation and settlement. “American statesmen and stateswomen have perpetuated a fiction,” maintains Khalidi. “This is that they can be faithful to solemn commitments made to Begin and subsequent Israeli leaders starting thirty-five years ago at Camp David, while at the same time supporting true Palestinian self-determination and achieving a sustainable, just, and peaceful resolution of the conflict. They cannot.”  RASHID KHALIDI is the author of seven books about the Middle East, including Palestinian Identity, Resurrecting Empire, The Iron Cage, and Sowing Crisis. His writing on Middle Eastern history and politics has appeared in the New York Times, the Boston Globe, theLos Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and many journals. For his work on the Middle East, Professor Khalidi has received fellowships and grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the American Research Center in Egypt, and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others. He is Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University in New York. |
Saturday, 13 April 2013
Democracy Now, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2013
The awesome Amira Hass saying what needs to be said: The Palestinians have the RIGHT to resist.
A right is not something one needs to earn. A right is a natural given.
Israeli Journalist Amira Hass Sparks Furor at Home for Defending Palestinian Right to Resist
Friday, 12 April 2013
Wednesday, 10 April 2013
Wednesday, 3 April 2013
Monday, 1 April 2013
Sunday, 31 March 2013
Today, humanity...
... at large is faces daunting threats. Human rights are under daily assaults in many countries and the twin threats of resource scarcity and climate change loom over us. The global economic system is under strain as never before and, in response to past and current imperial insults and the colonialization of cultures, there has been a rise in violent extremism against the West. (...)
Peace Review: Volume 25, Issue 1. 2013, p. 42-50: "Making Peace Global"
Diana Francis
Peace Review: Volume 25, Issue 1. 2013, p. 42-50: "Making Peace Global"
Sunday, 2 December 2012
Suad Amiry Quoting Sharon 1973
I recalled what Ariel Sharon had said in 1973, when asked by Winston S. Churchill III, grandson of the former British prime minister, how Israel would deal with the Palestinians: “We’ll make a pastrami sandwich of them. We’ll insert a strip of Jewish settlements in between the Palestinians, and then another strip of Jewish settlements right across the West Bank, so that in twenty-five years, neither the United Nations, nor the U.S.A., nobody, will be able to tear it apart” (Water and Land Grab Report 2003 ).
Saturday, 24 November 2012
What you need to know
Analysis | The Four Big Lies of Palestine-Israel Media Coverage (Ceasefiremag.uk)
In the aftermath of Israel's latest attack on Gaza, we republish a
major essay from our 2009 print issue by James Turner, in which he
identifies the "Four Big Lies" that shape Media coverage - and even
scholarly analysis - of the situation in Israel and Palestine.
Thursday, 22 November 2012
DLF Interview mit Save the Children Germany
dradio.de
http://www.dradio.de/dlf/20.11.2012
Herzrasen, Angst und Tränen
Die Kinder des Gazakonflikts
Friedbert Meurer im Gespräch mit Kathrin Wieland
Die Hilfsorganisation "Save the Children" hat Kinder im Gazastreifen befragt. Da ist von Herzrasen, nicht schlafen können vor Angst und einfach wieder ganz normal in die Schule gehen wollen die Rede - und der Sehnsucht nach einem Waffenstillstand zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern.
Friedbert Meurer: Auf
palästinensischer Seite gibt es mittlerweile über 100 Tote, so die
offizielle Bilanz; auf israelischer Seite drei. Die Raketen der Hamas
mögen Terror, Angst und Schrecken in Süd-Israel verbreiten - dass die
Zahl der Opfer unter den Palästinensern rapide ansteigt, Kinder auch
verletzt und getötet werden und das Missverhältnis in Zahlen so groß
ist, das bringt die israelische Regierung international zunehmend unter
Druck.
Die Palästinenser werfen der Bundesregierung vor, einseitig aufseiten Israels zu stehen. In der Kritik steht damit wieder auch ein Versprechen von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel, das sie vor etwa vier Jahren gegeben hat.
O-Ton Angela Merkel: "Jede Bundesregierung und jeder Bundeskanzler vor mir waren der besonderen historischen Verantwortung Deutschlands für die Sicherheit Israels verpflichtet. Diese historische Verantwortung Deutschlands ist Teil der Staatsräson meines Landes. Das heißt: Die Sicherheit Israels ist für mich als deutsche Bundeskanzlerin niemals verhandelbar."
Meurer: Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel im Jahr 2008 vor der Knesset. Ihr Außenminister, Guido Westerwelle, ist zurzeit in Jerusalem, war auch kurz in Ramallah.
Der Krieg zwischen Israel und Gaza trifft immer mehr auch die Zivilbevölkerung. Vereinzelt in Tel Aviv müssen die Menschen die Schutzräume aufsuchen, im Süden Israels sowieso. Im Gazastreifen warnt die israelische Armee die Palästinenser, sie sollen sich von Einrichtungen der Hamas fernhalten, um nicht Opfer zu werden. Das ist aber nicht so einfach, der Gazastreifen ist ja dicht besiedelt. "Save the Children" ist eine internationale Hilfsorganisation für Kinder, die ihren Hauptsitz in London hat, aber auch einen Zweig in Deutschland, und deren Geschäftsführerin von "Save the Children" Deutschland ist Kathrin Wieland. Guten Tag, Frau Wieland.
Kathrin Wieland: Guten Tag, Herr Meurer.
Meurer: Wie sehr leiden die Kinder im Gazastreifen unter dem Krieg?
Wieland: Man muss erst mal sagen, von den 1,7 Millionen Menschen, die im Gazastreifen leben, ist die Hälfte Kinder. Das heißt, das sind 850.000 Kinder, die meisten unter 14 Jahre alt, die dort leiden. Und man muss auch sagen, dass die Situation für Kinder natürlich entsetzlich ist und extrem gefährlich. Die Anzahl toter und verletzter Kinder steigt. Wir haben heute von der UN die Zahl bekommen, dass 140 Kinder jetzt in den letzten sieben Tagen verletzt wurden.
Meurer: Die Kinder halten sich ausschließlich nur noch zuhause auf, um dort sicherer zu sein als im Freien?
Wieland: Ja. Soweit wir wissen, von unseren Kollegen vor Ort - wir haben 50 Kollegen noch vor Ort, die natürlich auch vor Ort bleiben -, sind die Schulen geschlossen und natürlich haben die Eltern furchtbare Angst und behalten ihre Kinder drinnen, und das ist natürlich, wenn man weiß, die Versorgung mit Nahrung ist nicht gegeben, viele Familien haben nichts mehr zuhause, Wasser fließt nicht mehr oder es kommt sehr verunreinigt durch die Leitungen, der Strom fällt bis zu 18 Stunden am Tag aus, man kann sich vorstellen, was das für Kinder bedeutet. Wir haben Zitate von Kindern, die einfach beschreiben, was mit ihnen passiert, wenn sie die Drohnen oder die Bomber hören.
Meurer: Die Zitate, sagen Sie. Mitarbeiter von Ihnen haben Befragungen vorgenommen an Kindern, Kinder befragt im Gazastreifen. Was haben die gesagt?
Wieland: Ich zitiere mal ein 14-jähriges Mädchen, Liliane, die einfach sagte, dass es sie sehr traurig macht, was passiert, dass sie auch nicht mehr schlafen kann. Und dann sagt sie, ich zitiere: Mein Herz fängt an zu rasen, wann immer ich einen F16-Bomber über mir höre. Und sie sagt auch, dass es sie wahnsinnig traurig macht, was mit ihrem Land passiert. Und was ich besonders beeindruckend finde: Alle Kinder haben gesagt, dass sie sich eine friedliche Situation wünschen, dass sie die Schule vermissen. Und Liliane sagt dann, ich wünsche mir, dass beide Seiten den Waffenstillstand akzeptieren und die Bombardements aufhören. Ich möchte frei und sicher leben. Und ich hoffe, dass diese Stimmen der Kinder gehört werden, weil wir natürlich auch fordern, die Kampfhandlungen sofort einzustellen und alles dafür zu tun, die Gewalt zu beenden.
Meurer: Warum hat eigentlich die Hamas keine Schutzräume gebaut, so wie es das in Süd-Israel gibt?
Wieland: Na ja, durch die Blockade ist natürlich Baumaterial schwer zu bekommen. Wir arbeiten ja seit 1973 im Gazastreifen. Wir sind in den letzten Jahren massiv dabei gewesen, Kindergärten und Schulen wieder aufzubauen unter sehr schwierigen Bedingungen.
Meurer: Was werden Sie jetzt machen?
Wieland: Sobald es die Bedingungen erlauben, unsere Mitarbeiter natürlich auch einigermaßen sich bewegen können, werden wir Familien mit dem Nötigsten versorgen. Das heißt, wir werden Lebensmittelpakete, Wasser, aber auch Medikamente und chirurgische Instrumente an Familien und Krankenhäuser verteilen. Und wir wollen auch das, was Sie gerade ansprachen: Wir wollen Spiel- und Schutzzelte für Kinder auch errichten, also Zelte, in denen sie dann hoffentlich, oder Räume, in denen sie sicher sind und in denen sie vor allen Dingen Personen finden, die mit ihnen arbeiten, die mit ihnen spielen, sodass sie ein Stück weit zur Normalität zurückfinden und halt auch ihre Erlebnisse verarbeiten können.
Meurer: Ist das jetzt geplant für die Zeit, in der noch die Raketenangriffe anhalten, oder für die Zeit danach?
Wieland: Das bleibt den Kollegen vor Ort natürlich in der Planung überlassen und auch, wie sicher sie sich fühlen. Das kann ich Ihnen momentan gar nicht beantworten. Wir sind täglich im Kontakt, und heute haben wir noch nicht wirklich gehört, was für heute geplant ist. Das kann sich natürlich von Stunde zu Stunde ändern, aber es ist so, dass unsere Mitarbeiter sich auch treffen und an den Einsatzplänen arbeiten, und ich denke, sobald irgendwo sie das Gefühl haben, dass sie sich hier sicher bewegen können, werden sie losfahren.
Meurer: Sie haben eben kurz das Thema Lebensmittel angesprochen. Es gibt ja Hunderte von Tunnel, durch die eigentlich fleißig geliefert wird. Auch Israel sagt, so strikt ist doch unsere Blockade gar nicht mehr. Warum gibt es zu wenig Lebensmittel?
Wieland: Ja gut, das ist natürlich eine Frage von Einkommen und Verteilung und Möglichkeiten. Was wir wissen ist, dass 44 Prozent der palästinensischen Familien sich eben nicht vernünftig ernähren können und dass 70 Prozent aller Kleinkinder in Gaza mangelernährt sind.
Meurer: Also es ist eine Frage von Arm und Reich im Gazastreifen, oder?
Wieland: Es ist glaube ich, immer ein Stück eine Frage von Arm und Reich, aber es ist auch ein Stück die Frage, was wirklich durch die Tunnel kommt. Und was wir sehen, was wir kennen ist, dass die Kinder stark mangelernährt sind, dass Kinder sehr klein gewachsen sind, ein von zehn Kindern als (?) zu bezeichnen ist, also durch konstante Mangelernährung eben sehr, sehr klein gewachsen ist, nicht wirklich entwickelt ist altersgemäß, und das ist immer ein Zeichen dafür, dass diese Kinder dauerhaft nicht genug und nicht das richtige zu essen bekommen.
Meurer: Das war Kathrin Wieland, die Geschäftsführerin der Hilfsorganisation "Save the Children" Deutschland, zur Situation der Kinder im Gazastreifen. Danke schön, Frau Wieland, auf Wiederhören.
Wieland: Ich danke Ihnen.
Äußerungen unserer Gesprächspartner geben deren eigene Auffassungen wieder. Deutschlandradio macht sich Äußerungen seiner Gesprächspartner in Interviews und Diskussionen nicht zu eigen.
Die Palästinenser werfen der Bundesregierung vor, einseitig aufseiten Israels zu stehen. In der Kritik steht damit wieder auch ein Versprechen von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel, das sie vor etwa vier Jahren gegeben hat.
O-Ton Angela Merkel: "Jede Bundesregierung und jeder Bundeskanzler vor mir waren der besonderen historischen Verantwortung Deutschlands für die Sicherheit Israels verpflichtet. Diese historische Verantwortung Deutschlands ist Teil der Staatsräson meines Landes. Das heißt: Die Sicherheit Israels ist für mich als deutsche Bundeskanzlerin niemals verhandelbar."
Meurer: Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel im Jahr 2008 vor der Knesset. Ihr Außenminister, Guido Westerwelle, ist zurzeit in Jerusalem, war auch kurz in Ramallah.
Der Krieg zwischen Israel und Gaza trifft immer mehr auch die Zivilbevölkerung. Vereinzelt in Tel Aviv müssen die Menschen die Schutzräume aufsuchen, im Süden Israels sowieso. Im Gazastreifen warnt die israelische Armee die Palästinenser, sie sollen sich von Einrichtungen der Hamas fernhalten, um nicht Opfer zu werden. Das ist aber nicht so einfach, der Gazastreifen ist ja dicht besiedelt. "Save the Children" ist eine internationale Hilfsorganisation für Kinder, die ihren Hauptsitz in London hat, aber auch einen Zweig in Deutschland, und deren Geschäftsführerin von "Save the Children" Deutschland ist Kathrin Wieland. Guten Tag, Frau Wieland.
Kathrin Wieland: Guten Tag, Herr Meurer.
Meurer: Wie sehr leiden die Kinder im Gazastreifen unter dem Krieg?
Wieland: Man muss erst mal sagen, von den 1,7 Millionen Menschen, die im Gazastreifen leben, ist die Hälfte Kinder. Das heißt, das sind 850.000 Kinder, die meisten unter 14 Jahre alt, die dort leiden. Und man muss auch sagen, dass die Situation für Kinder natürlich entsetzlich ist und extrem gefährlich. Die Anzahl toter und verletzter Kinder steigt. Wir haben heute von der UN die Zahl bekommen, dass 140 Kinder jetzt in den letzten sieben Tagen verletzt wurden.
Meurer: Die Kinder halten sich ausschließlich nur noch zuhause auf, um dort sicherer zu sein als im Freien?
Wieland: Ja. Soweit wir wissen, von unseren Kollegen vor Ort - wir haben 50 Kollegen noch vor Ort, die natürlich auch vor Ort bleiben -, sind die Schulen geschlossen und natürlich haben die Eltern furchtbare Angst und behalten ihre Kinder drinnen, und das ist natürlich, wenn man weiß, die Versorgung mit Nahrung ist nicht gegeben, viele Familien haben nichts mehr zuhause, Wasser fließt nicht mehr oder es kommt sehr verunreinigt durch die Leitungen, der Strom fällt bis zu 18 Stunden am Tag aus, man kann sich vorstellen, was das für Kinder bedeutet. Wir haben Zitate von Kindern, die einfach beschreiben, was mit ihnen passiert, wenn sie die Drohnen oder die Bomber hören.
Meurer: Die Zitate, sagen Sie. Mitarbeiter von Ihnen haben Befragungen vorgenommen an Kindern, Kinder befragt im Gazastreifen. Was haben die gesagt?
Wieland: Ich zitiere mal ein 14-jähriges Mädchen, Liliane, die einfach sagte, dass es sie sehr traurig macht, was passiert, dass sie auch nicht mehr schlafen kann. Und dann sagt sie, ich zitiere: Mein Herz fängt an zu rasen, wann immer ich einen F16-Bomber über mir höre. Und sie sagt auch, dass es sie wahnsinnig traurig macht, was mit ihrem Land passiert. Und was ich besonders beeindruckend finde: Alle Kinder haben gesagt, dass sie sich eine friedliche Situation wünschen, dass sie die Schule vermissen. Und Liliane sagt dann, ich wünsche mir, dass beide Seiten den Waffenstillstand akzeptieren und die Bombardements aufhören. Ich möchte frei und sicher leben. Und ich hoffe, dass diese Stimmen der Kinder gehört werden, weil wir natürlich auch fordern, die Kampfhandlungen sofort einzustellen und alles dafür zu tun, die Gewalt zu beenden.
Meurer: Warum hat eigentlich die Hamas keine Schutzräume gebaut, so wie es das in Süd-Israel gibt?
Wieland: Na ja, durch die Blockade ist natürlich Baumaterial schwer zu bekommen. Wir arbeiten ja seit 1973 im Gazastreifen. Wir sind in den letzten Jahren massiv dabei gewesen, Kindergärten und Schulen wieder aufzubauen unter sehr schwierigen Bedingungen.
Meurer: Was werden Sie jetzt machen?
Wieland: Sobald es die Bedingungen erlauben, unsere Mitarbeiter natürlich auch einigermaßen sich bewegen können, werden wir Familien mit dem Nötigsten versorgen. Das heißt, wir werden Lebensmittelpakete, Wasser, aber auch Medikamente und chirurgische Instrumente an Familien und Krankenhäuser verteilen. Und wir wollen auch das, was Sie gerade ansprachen: Wir wollen Spiel- und Schutzzelte für Kinder auch errichten, also Zelte, in denen sie dann hoffentlich, oder Räume, in denen sie sicher sind und in denen sie vor allen Dingen Personen finden, die mit ihnen arbeiten, die mit ihnen spielen, sodass sie ein Stück weit zur Normalität zurückfinden und halt auch ihre Erlebnisse verarbeiten können.
Meurer: Ist das jetzt geplant für die Zeit, in der noch die Raketenangriffe anhalten, oder für die Zeit danach?
Wieland: Das bleibt den Kollegen vor Ort natürlich in der Planung überlassen und auch, wie sicher sie sich fühlen. Das kann ich Ihnen momentan gar nicht beantworten. Wir sind täglich im Kontakt, und heute haben wir noch nicht wirklich gehört, was für heute geplant ist. Das kann sich natürlich von Stunde zu Stunde ändern, aber es ist so, dass unsere Mitarbeiter sich auch treffen und an den Einsatzplänen arbeiten, und ich denke, sobald irgendwo sie das Gefühl haben, dass sie sich hier sicher bewegen können, werden sie losfahren.
Meurer: Sie haben eben kurz das Thema Lebensmittel angesprochen. Es gibt ja Hunderte von Tunnel, durch die eigentlich fleißig geliefert wird. Auch Israel sagt, so strikt ist doch unsere Blockade gar nicht mehr. Warum gibt es zu wenig Lebensmittel?
Wieland: Ja gut, das ist natürlich eine Frage von Einkommen und Verteilung und Möglichkeiten. Was wir wissen ist, dass 44 Prozent der palästinensischen Familien sich eben nicht vernünftig ernähren können und dass 70 Prozent aller Kleinkinder in Gaza mangelernährt sind.
Meurer: Also es ist eine Frage von Arm und Reich im Gazastreifen, oder?
Wieland: Es ist glaube ich, immer ein Stück eine Frage von Arm und Reich, aber es ist auch ein Stück die Frage, was wirklich durch die Tunnel kommt. Und was wir sehen, was wir kennen ist, dass die Kinder stark mangelernährt sind, dass Kinder sehr klein gewachsen sind, ein von zehn Kindern als (?) zu bezeichnen ist, also durch konstante Mangelernährung eben sehr, sehr klein gewachsen ist, nicht wirklich entwickelt ist altersgemäß, und das ist immer ein Zeichen dafür, dass diese Kinder dauerhaft nicht genug und nicht das richtige zu essen bekommen.
Meurer: Das war Kathrin Wieland, die Geschäftsführerin der Hilfsorganisation "Save the Children" Deutschland, zur Situation der Kinder im Gazastreifen. Danke schön, Frau Wieland, auf Wiederhören.
Wieland: Ich danke Ihnen.
Äußerungen unserer Gesprächspartner geben deren eigene Auffassungen wieder. Deutschlandradio macht sich Äußerungen seiner Gesprächspartner in Interviews und Diskussionen nicht zu eigen.
Thursday, 27 September 2012
From: Telepolis/Heise online
The German-Israeli Love Affair Must End
Ghada Karmi
13.09.2012
A Palestinian View
I have never understood why Germans are so hostile
towards Palestinians. We all know that Germans are consumed by guilt
about Jews. Even now, nearly 70 years after the end of WWII, they still
feel some measure of this, by heredity if nothing else, since most of
them weren't even born before 1945. And neither, for that matter, was
Israel. Nazism had ended three years before Israel's establishment. Yet,
this new state has come to represent all the Jews who suffered from the
holocaust and their descendants, apparently for all time. Israel became
the shrine for German atonement, remorse and guilt, unabated by the
passage of time.
German-Israeli relations are very close. War reparations
to Israel have cost Germany billions of dollars, and continue till
today. Germany's leaders routinely make obeisance to Israel. In recent
visits Germany's president and its chancellor, have been extravagant in
their praise and pledged their undying support for the Jewish state. In
the last month, Germany has sent 3 advanced Dolphin submarines to
Israel, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, part of whose cost will be
borne by Germany. Another three are promised by 2018, despite German
displeasure at Israel's settlement expansion.
But why should this friendliness towards Israel be
coupled with an equal antipathy for Palestinians, the very people who
were sacrificed to compensate for the crimes of Nazism, whose country
became Israel while they became stateless refugees? I saw this conundrum
in action in Germany recently. Last February I was invited to speak on
Palestine at a Middle East conference at the University of Bremen. But
at the last minute the invitation was withdrawn because the university
heads considered my views were "not appropriate".
It later emerged that an Israeli Ph.D. student had
protested that the conference, and presumably myself, were
"anti-Semitic". In June I attended a conference
at the Freie Universitat Berlin, organised by the university's
Research College in cooperation with the German Council on Foreign
Relations. The subject was Europe and the Arab Spring.
What followed was a depressing display of German
sycophancy towards the Israeli participants and a barely disguised
discomfort with me, as if they had regretted their boldness in allowing a
Palestinian voice to be heard. The chairman of the first session, who
represented the German Council on Foreign Relations, introduced me
astonishingly as "a Palestinian terrorist according to some Israelis".
My obvious consternation received neither apology nor explanation. Only
after the session ended and on direct questioning, he said he was
reading my biography as given by the organisers. The latter denied that,
saying I had been described only as "an activist". None of them
apologised at the time.
My talk about the EU's well-documented partiality
for Israel, the privileges and preferential treatment accorded to
Israeli trade and scientific institutions, the frequetly-obeserved fact
that Israel has become a European state in all but name, had a cool
reception. One conference organiser complained that they wanted
political analysis, not "political advocacy". An Israeli participant
objected that the meeting was not about the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and Israel's former ambassador to Germany asserted angrily he
could refute every point I had made, as if we had been at a political
rally, not an academic meeting. The other particants largely avoided me,
by contrast to the effusiveness with which they treated the Israelis
there.
This unpleasant episode demonstrated to me the
depth of fear that Germans still have of criticising Israel, and by
extension, their rejection of Palestinians. Extraordinary that the
victims of Israel have been turned into the villains and the occupier of
their land has become a hero. I came away convinced that Germans,
whatever the role of their ancestors under Nazism, will have to come to
terms with their history and see the world as it is. Israel is a state
with indefensible policies of discrimination and oppression of another
people, offensive to the civilised values we all aspire to.
Recognising this fact in no way implies an
abnegation of Germany's responsibility for the Jews who perished at the
hands of Nazis 70 years and their descendants are owed the fullest
restitution. It was the failure to distinguish between the Israeli state
and the Jewish victims of Nazism which I saw amongst Germans; the
consequence of this is an exaggerated indulgence of Israel whatever
crime it commits and an irrational hatred of its Palestinian victims. It
is time to end both the indulgence and the hatred.
Dr Ghada Karmi is a Research Fellow at the University of Exeter, England.
German version: Die Liebesgeschichte zwischen Deutschland und Israel muss enden.
Wednesday, 28 September 2011
Uri Avnery September 24, 2011
Uri Avnery
September 24, 2011
Abu Mazen’s Gamble
A WONDERFUL SPEECH. A beautiful speech.
The language expressive and elegant. The arguments clear and convincing. The delivery flawless.
A work of art. The art of hypocrisy. Almost every statement in the passage concerning the Israeli-Palestinian issue was a lie. A blatant lie: the speaker knew it was a lie, and so did the audience.
It was Obama at his best, Obama at his worst.
Being a moral person, he must have felt the urge to vomit. Being a pragmatic person, he knew that he had to do it, if he wanted to be re-elected.
In essence, he sold the fundamental national interests of the United States of America for the chance of a second term.
Not very nice, but that’s politics, OK?
IT MAY be superfluous – almost insulting to the reader – to point out the mendacious details of this rhetorical edifice.
Obama treated the two sides as if they were equal in strength – Israelis and Palestinians, Palestinians and Israelis.
But of the two, it is the Israelis - only they – who suffer and have suffered. Persecution. Exile. Holocaust. An Israeli child threatened by rockets. Surrounded by the hatred of Arab children. So sad.
No Occupation. No settlements. No June 1967 borders. No Naqba. No Palestinian children killed or frightened. It’s the straight right-wing Israeli propaganda line, pure and simple – the terminology, the historical narrative, the argumentation. The music.
The Palestinians, of course, should have a state of their own. Sure, sure. But they must not be pushy. They must not embarrass the US. They must not come to the UN. They must sit with the Israelis, like reasonable people, and work it out with them. The reasonable sheep must sit down with the reasonable wolf and decide what to have for dinner. Foreigners should not interfere.
Obama gave full service. A lady who provides this kind of service generally gets paid in advance. Obama got paid immediately afterwards, within the hour. Netanyahu sat down with him in front of the cameras and gave him enough quotable professions of love and gratitude to last for several election campaigns.
THE TRAGIC hero of this affair is Mahmoud Abbas. A tragic hero, but a hero nonetheless.
Many people may be surprised by this sudden emergence of Abbas as a daring player for high stakes, ready to confront the mighty US.
If Ariel Sharon were to wake up for a moment from his years-long coma, he would faint with amazement. It was he who called Mahmoud Abbas “a plucked chicken”.
Yet for the last few days, Abbas was the center of global attention. World leaders conferred about how to handle him, senior diplomats were eager to convince him of this or that course of action, commentators were guessing what he would do next. His speech before the UN General Assembly was treated as an event of consequence.
Not bad for a chicken, even for one with a full set of feathers.
His emergence as a leader on the world stage is somewhat reminiscent of Anwar Sadat.
When Gamal Abd-al-Nasser unexpectedly died at the age of 52 in 1970 and his official deputy, Sadat, assumed his mantle, all political experts shrugged.
Sadat? Who the hell is that? He was considered a nonentity, an eternal No. 2, one of the least important members of the group of “free officers” that was ruling Egypt.
In Egypt, a land of jokes and jokers, witticisms about him abounded. One concerned the prominent brown mark on his forehead. The official version was that it was the result of much praying, hitting the ground with his forehead. But the real reason, it was told, was that at meetings, after everyone else had spoken, Sadat would get up and try to say something. Nasser would good-naturedly put his finger to his forehead, push him gently down and say: “Sit, Anwar!”
To the utter amazement of the experts – and especially the Israeli ones – this “nonentity” took a huge gamble by starting the 1973 October War, and proceeded to do something unprecedented in history: going to the capital of an enemy country still officially in a state of war and making peace.
Abbas’ status under Yasser Arafat was not unlike Sadat’s under Nasser. However, Arafat never appointed a deputy. Abbas was one of a group of four or five likely successors. The heir would surely have been Abu Jihad, had he not been killed by Israeli commandoes in front of his wife and children. Another likely candidate, Abu Iyad, was killed by Palestinian terrorists. Abu Mazen (Abbas) was in a way the choice by default.
Such politicians, emerging suddenly from under the shadow of a great leader, generally fall into one of two categories: the eternal frustrated No. 2 or the surprising new leader.
The Bible gives us examples of both kinds. The first was Rehoboam, the son and heir of the great King Solomon, who told his people: “my father chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions”. The other kind was represented by Joshua, the heir of Moses. He was no second Moses, but according to the story a great conqueror in his own right.
Modern history tells the sad story of Anthony Eden, the long-suffering No. 2 of Winston Churchill, who commanded little respect. (Mussolini called him, after their first meeting, “a well-tailored idiot.”). Upon assuming power, he tried desperately to equal Churchill and soon embroiled Britain in the 1956 Suez disaster. To the second category belonged Harry Truman, the nobody who succeeded the great Franklin Delano Roosevelt and surprised everybody as a resolute leader.
Abbas looked like belonging to the first kind. Now, suddenly, he is revealed as belonging to the second. The world is treating him with newfound respect. Nearing the end of his career, he made the big gamble.
BUT WAS it wise? Courageous, yes. Daring, yes. But wise?
My answer is: Yes, it was.
Abbas has placed the quest for Palestinian freedom squarely on the international table. For more than a week, Palestine has been the center of international attention. Scores of international statesmen and -women, including the leader of the world’s only superpower, have been busy with Palestine.
For a national movement, that is of the utmost importance. Cynics may ask: “So what did they gain from it?” But cynics are fools. A liberation movement gains from the very fact that the world pays attention, that the media grapple with the problem, that people of conscience all over the world are aroused. It strengthens morale at home and brings the struggle a step nearer its goal.
Oppression shuns the limelight. Occupation, settlements, ethnic cleansing thrive in the shadows. It is the oppressed who need the light of day. Abbas’ move provided it, at least for the time being.
BARACK OBAMA’s miserable performance was a nail in the coffin of America’s status as a superpower. In a way, it was a crime against the United States.
The Arab Spring may have been a last chance for the US to recover its standing in the Middle East. After some hesitation, Obama realized that. He called on Mubarak to go, helped the Libyans against their tyrant, made some noises about Bashar al-Assad. He knows that he has to regain the respect of the Arab masses if he wants to recover some stature in the region, and by extension throughout the world.
Now he has blown it, perhaps forever. No self-respecting Arab will forgive him for plunging his knife into the back of the helpless Palestinians. All the credit the US has tried to gain in the last months in the Arab and the wider Muslim world has been blown away with one puff.
All for reelection.
IT WAS also a crime against Israel.
Israel needs peace. Israel needs to live side by side with the Palestinian people, within the Arab world. Israel cannot rely forever on the unconditional support of the declining United States.
Obama knows this full well. He knows what is good for Israel, even if Netanyahu doesn’t. Yet he has handed the keys of the car to the drunken driver.
The State of Palestine will come into being. This week it was already clear that this is unavoidable. Obama will be forgotten, as will Netanyahu, Lieberman and the whole bunch.
Mahmoud Abbas – Abu Mazen, as the Palestinians call him – will be remembered. The “plucked chicken” is soaring into the sky.
September 24, 2011
Abu Mazen’s Gamble
A WONDERFUL SPEECH. A beautiful speech.
The language expressive and elegant. The arguments clear and convincing. The delivery flawless.
A work of art. The art of hypocrisy. Almost every statement in the passage concerning the Israeli-Palestinian issue was a lie. A blatant lie: the speaker knew it was a lie, and so did the audience.
It was Obama at his best, Obama at his worst.
Being a moral person, he must have felt the urge to vomit. Being a pragmatic person, he knew that he had to do it, if he wanted to be re-elected.
In essence, he sold the fundamental national interests of the United States of America for the chance of a second term.
Not very nice, but that’s politics, OK?
IT MAY be superfluous – almost insulting to the reader – to point out the mendacious details of this rhetorical edifice.
Obama treated the two sides as if they were equal in strength – Israelis and Palestinians, Palestinians and Israelis.
But of the two, it is the Israelis - only they – who suffer and have suffered. Persecution. Exile. Holocaust. An Israeli child threatened by rockets. Surrounded by the hatred of Arab children. So sad.
No Occupation. No settlements. No June 1967 borders. No Naqba. No Palestinian children killed or frightened. It’s the straight right-wing Israeli propaganda line, pure and simple – the terminology, the historical narrative, the argumentation. The music.
The Palestinians, of course, should have a state of their own. Sure, sure. But they must not be pushy. They must not embarrass the US. They must not come to the UN. They must sit with the Israelis, like reasonable people, and work it out with them. The reasonable sheep must sit down with the reasonable wolf and decide what to have for dinner. Foreigners should not interfere.
Obama gave full service. A lady who provides this kind of service generally gets paid in advance. Obama got paid immediately afterwards, within the hour. Netanyahu sat down with him in front of the cameras and gave him enough quotable professions of love and gratitude to last for several election campaigns.
THE TRAGIC hero of this affair is Mahmoud Abbas. A tragic hero, but a hero nonetheless.
Many people may be surprised by this sudden emergence of Abbas as a daring player for high stakes, ready to confront the mighty US.
If Ariel Sharon were to wake up for a moment from his years-long coma, he would faint with amazement. It was he who called Mahmoud Abbas “a plucked chicken”.
Yet for the last few days, Abbas was the center of global attention. World leaders conferred about how to handle him, senior diplomats were eager to convince him of this or that course of action, commentators were guessing what he would do next. His speech before the UN General Assembly was treated as an event of consequence.
Not bad for a chicken, even for one with a full set of feathers.
His emergence as a leader on the world stage is somewhat reminiscent of Anwar Sadat.
When Gamal Abd-al-Nasser unexpectedly died at the age of 52 in 1970 and his official deputy, Sadat, assumed his mantle, all political experts shrugged.
Sadat? Who the hell is that? He was considered a nonentity, an eternal No. 2, one of the least important members of the group of “free officers” that was ruling Egypt.
In Egypt, a land of jokes and jokers, witticisms about him abounded. One concerned the prominent brown mark on his forehead. The official version was that it was the result of much praying, hitting the ground with his forehead. But the real reason, it was told, was that at meetings, after everyone else had spoken, Sadat would get up and try to say something. Nasser would good-naturedly put his finger to his forehead, push him gently down and say: “Sit, Anwar!”
To the utter amazement of the experts – and especially the Israeli ones – this “nonentity” took a huge gamble by starting the 1973 October War, and proceeded to do something unprecedented in history: going to the capital of an enemy country still officially in a state of war and making peace.
Abbas’ status under Yasser Arafat was not unlike Sadat’s under Nasser. However, Arafat never appointed a deputy. Abbas was one of a group of four or five likely successors. The heir would surely have been Abu Jihad, had he not been killed by Israeli commandoes in front of his wife and children. Another likely candidate, Abu Iyad, was killed by Palestinian terrorists. Abu Mazen (Abbas) was in a way the choice by default.
Such politicians, emerging suddenly from under the shadow of a great leader, generally fall into one of two categories: the eternal frustrated No. 2 or the surprising new leader.
The Bible gives us examples of both kinds. The first was Rehoboam, the son and heir of the great King Solomon, who told his people: “my father chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions”. The other kind was represented by Joshua, the heir of Moses. He was no second Moses, but according to the story a great conqueror in his own right.
Modern history tells the sad story of Anthony Eden, the long-suffering No. 2 of Winston Churchill, who commanded little respect. (Mussolini called him, after their first meeting, “a well-tailored idiot.”). Upon assuming power, he tried desperately to equal Churchill and soon embroiled Britain in the 1956 Suez disaster. To the second category belonged Harry Truman, the nobody who succeeded the great Franklin Delano Roosevelt and surprised everybody as a resolute leader.
Abbas looked like belonging to the first kind. Now, suddenly, he is revealed as belonging to the second. The world is treating him with newfound respect. Nearing the end of his career, he made the big gamble.
BUT WAS it wise? Courageous, yes. Daring, yes. But wise?
My answer is: Yes, it was.
Abbas has placed the quest for Palestinian freedom squarely on the international table. For more than a week, Palestine has been the center of international attention. Scores of international statesmen and -women, including the leader of the world’s only superpower, have been busy with Palestine.
For a national movement, that is of the utmost importance. Cynics may ask: “So what did they gain from it?” But cynics are fools. A liberation movement gains from the very fact that the world pays attention, that the media grapple with the problem, that people of conscience all over the world are aroused. It strengthens morale at home and brings the struggle a step nearer its goal.
Oppression shuns the limelight. Occupation, settlements, ethnic cleansing thrive in the shadows. It is the oppressed who need the light of day. Abbas’ move provided it, at least for the time being.
BARACK OBAMA’s miserable performance was a nail in the coffin of America’s status as a superpower. In a way, it was a crime against the United States.
The Arab Spring may have been a last chance for the US to recover its standing in the Middle East. After some hesitation, Obama realized that. He called on Mubarak to go, helped the Libyans against their tyrant, made some noises about Bashar al-Assad. He knows that he has to regain the respect of the Arab masses if he wants to recover some stature in the region, and by extension throughout the world.
Now he has blown it, perhaps forever. No self-respecting Arab will forgive him for plunging his knife into the back of the helpless Palestinians. All the credit the US has tried to gain in the last months in the Arab and the wider Muslim world has been blown away with one puff.
All for reelection.
IT WAS also a crime against Israel.
Israel needs peace. Israel needs to live side by side with the Palestinian people, within the Arab world. Israel cannot rely forever on the unconditional support of the declining United States.
Obama knows this full well. He knows what is good for Israel, even if Netanyahu doesn’t. Yet he has handed the keys of the car to the drunken driver.
The State of Palestine will come into being. This week it was already clear that this is unavoidable. Obama will be forgotten, as will Netanyahu, Lieberman and the whole bunch.
Mahmoud Abbas – Abu Mazen, as the Palestinians call him – will be remembered. The “plucked chicken” is soaring into the sky.
Wednesday, 21 September 2011
Sunday, 18 September 2011
Monday, 12 September 2011
Thursday, 8 September 2011
Friday, 5 August 2011
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